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Abstract—Digitised and born-digital Audio-Visual (AV) content
presents new challenges for preservation and Quality Assurance
(QA) to ensure that cultural heritage is accessible for the long
term. Digital archives have developed strategies for avoiding,
mitigating and recovering from digital AV loss using IT-based
systems, involving QA tools before ingesting files into the archive
and utilising file-based replication to repair files that may be
damaged while in the archive. However, while existing strategies
are effective for addressing issues related to media degradation,
issues such as format obsolescence and failures in processes and
people pose significant risk to the long-term value of digital
AV content. We present a Business Process Risk management
framework (BPRisk) designed to support preservation experts
in managing risks to long-term digital media preservation. This
framework combines workflow and risk specification within a
single risk management process designed to support continual
improvement of workflows. A semantic model has been developed
that allows the framework to incorporate expert knowledge from
both preservation and security experts in order to intelligently
aid workflow designers in creating and optimising workflows.
The framework also provides workflow simulation functionality,
allowing users to a) understand the key vulnerabilities in the
workflows, b) target investments to address those vulnerabilities,
and c) minimise the economic consequences of risks. The appli-
cation of the BPRisk framework is demonstrated on a use case
with the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation (ORF), discussing
simulation results and an evaluation against the outcomes of
executing the planned workflow.
Keywords–Risk management; business processes; workflows;
semantic modelling; simulation modelling.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital preservation aims to ensure that cultural heritage is
accessible for the long term. From the 20th century onwards,
AV content has provided a significant record of cultural
heritage, and increasing volumes of AV content that have
been digitised from analogue sources or produced digitally
present new preservation challenges. The focus is no longer
on reducing damage to the physical carrier by maintaining
a suitable environment; rather, archives must ensure that the
significant characteristics of the content, represented digitally,
are not lost over time. Digital data enables easier transfer,
copying, processing and manipulation of AV content, which
is at once a boon but also a problem that requires continuous
and active management of the data.
Digital damage is defined here as any degradation of the
value of the AV content with respect to its intended use
by a designated community that arises from the process of
ingesting, storing, migrating, transferring or accessing the
content. The focus here is on strategies that can be used to
minimise the risk of loss. In particular, we focus on dealing
with issues resulting from system errors, rather than random
failure or corruption, considering the risks to the AV content
as it is being manipulated by various activities in a workflow
process. This includes risks introduced by the people, systems
and processes put in place to keep the content safe in the first
place.
Archival processes dealing with digital AV content are
underpinned by IT systems. In the few years that archives
have been working with digitised and born-digital content, best
practice in terms of digital content management has rapidly
evolved. Strategies for avoiding, reducing and recovering from
digital damage have been developed and focus on improving
the robustness of technology, people and processes. These in-
clude strategies to maintain integrity, improve format resilience
and interoperability, and to combat format obsolescence.
This paper builds on [1], presenting the research and devel-
opment work of a Business Process Risk management frame-
work (BPRisk) developed in the EC FP7 DAVID project [2],
which combines risk management with workflow specification.
BPRisk has been designed to support a best practice approach
to risk management of digital AV processes (and thus the
content itself). In this paper, we will give an overview of this
framework, focusing on semantic modelling, risk specification
and simulation modelling. Within the DAVID project, this
research and development has been conducted to provide a tool
to help prevent damage to digital AV content in broadcasting
archives, although the approach is clearly applicable to any
digital archive management process where the same challenges
of workflow and migration risk are present.
The BPRisk framework is generic in nature, supporting
risk specification for Business Process Modelling Notation
(BPMN) 2.0 [3] workflows in any domain. The framework
utilises a novel semantic risk model developed in the project
that encapsulates domain knowledge generated in the DAVID
project on known risks (and controls) associated with ac-
tivities in a controlled vocabulary for the domain of digital
preservation (also developed in the project). This enables
the framework to be an effective support tool to users who
are typically not familiar with formal risk management. The
semantic risk modelling provides the domain experts with
a starting point for conducting risk analysis, and semantic
reasoning is utilised to provide suggestions of relevant risks
and controls for the activities in the respective workflows at
design time.
Another focus of this paper is the simulation modelling
adopted in the BPRisk framework. The purpose of the simu-
lation modelling is to help an organisation reduce costs by
designing or optimising workflows in order to reduce the
likelihood or impact of risks occurring. For example, it could
be used to help justify expenses on technology and control
tools, showing the anticipated cost of dealing with issues
(risks) when they are not addressed (controlled) versus the cost
of preventing them. That is, if the cost of prevention is less,
one could argue an anticipated Return On Investment (ROI).
Moreover, the simulations can help identify the key vulnera-
bilities in a workflow in order to help target investments. The
aim is to expose issues at design-time before a workflow is
actually executed.
In the DAVID project, the risk management work presented
in this paper is one of the four cornerstones of interlinked work
on i) understanding damage (how it occurs and its impact),
ii) detecting and repairing damage, iii) improving the quality
of digital AV content, and iv) preventing damage to digital
AV content and ensuring its long-term preservation. The latter
is a significant challenge, despite the advances in i) to iii),
especially with respect to format obsolescence and failure in
processes and people who handle the digital content, which is
discussed further below.
The challenges and related work on digital preservation
are discussed in Section II. Risk management in this domain
is discussed in Section III. Thereafter, in Section IV, we
present the BPRisk framework that has been developed in
the DAVID project. Following this, we present and discuss
further details of the semantic risk modelling and simulation
modelling adopted in the framework in Section V and VI,
respectively. Section VII discusses the application of BPRisk
on a real use case with the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation.
This includes simulation results from the planning stage of the
workflow development, and a comparison with the outcomes
from executing the workflow. Section VIII concludes this paper
and discusses future work.
II. DIGITAL PRESERVATION
AV content is generated in vast quantities from different
sources such as film, television and online media, environ-
mental monitoring, corporate training, surveillance and call
recording. There are many reasons why content needs to be
retained and archived, which might be to enable content re-use
for commercial, educational or historical purposes, but equally
it might need to be retained and accessible due to regulatory
compliance, for security or recording health and safety issues.
Historically, the preservation of analogue content has been
intrinsically linked to its method of production; specifically, the
media that is used to carry the signal (the carrier). This means
that archives preserved ‘masters’ on magnetic tape, film and
even phonograph cylinders [4]. Where masters no longer exist
or content was not professionally produced, archives needed
to preserve ‘access’ copies on media such as vinyl records,
VHS/Betamax tapes, and audio cassettes. To reduce the risk of
damage, archives had to consider the physical characteristics of
the media and care for the physical environment to which the
media was sensitive (e.g., light, heat, humidity and dust) and
to look after the machines that read the media. To increase the
chances of being able to read the content again, archives often
created copies of the artefact, in case one copy was damaged.
Nowadays, AV content is commonly born-digital and
archives such as INA (the French national archive) and ORF
(the Austrian broadcaster), who were partners in the DAVID
project, have initiated digital migration projects to digitise the
older, analogue, content [5]. Digital content (digitised or born
digital) can be copied, transferred, shared and manipulated far
more readily than its analogue equivalent. In a world of digital
AV content, preservation is largely agnostic to the carrier that is
used to store and deliver the content. Therefore, preservation
and archiving is about making sure that the digital data is
safe and that processes that manipulate the data do not cause
damage. When referring to ‘digital damage’ in this paper, it is
worth noting the following definition:
“Digital damage is any degradation of the value
of the AV content with respect to its intended use
by a designated community that arises from the
process of ingesting, storing, migrating, transferring
or accessing the content.” [5]
The above definition may seem broad. Indeed, it covers dam-
age arising from failure of the equipment used to store and
process digital content, as well as that arising from human
error or from ‘failure’ of the process. The challenge for
digital preservation is to keep the AV content usable for the
long-term, which is threatened by format obsolescence, media
degradation, and failures in the very people, processes and
systems designed to keep this content safe and accessible [6],
[7], [8].
Therefore, the core problem is greater than the potential for
a digital file already in the archive to become damaged over
time due to, e.g., bit rot [6], which can effectively be addressed
by keeping multiple copies of each file [5], [7]. We also need
to consider the future challenges for digital preservation as
some analyses [9] predict that as ever more 8K AV content is
ingested into archives, the growth in data volumes may outstrip
the predicted growth in data capacity, but more importantly
still, the data write speed necessary to store these high data
volumes at real time will not be achievable, meaning that it
will become impossible to cost-effectively store and replicate
such content as it is produced. Therefore, strategies such as
file-level replication may not be feasible in the future, and
managing risk to the entire workflow process, and determining
the most cost-effective archive management approach becomes
essential.
III. RISK MANAGEMENT FOR DIGITAL PRESERVATION
Risk management, in a broad sense, can be understood
as “the coordinated activities to direct and control an organ-
isation with respect to risk” [10]. Risk, as defined by ISO
31000 [10], is the “effect of uncertainty on objectives”. In
this context, uncertainty arises from random or systematic
failure of preservation systems and processes (that may involve
manual human activities). The effect of which is to cause
damage to AV content. In general terms, we can say that the
key objective is to ensure long-term preservation of digital AV
content, i.e., avoid damage and ensure that it can be accessed
in the future.
Current archives such as the French national archive (INA)
and the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation (ORF) typically
deploy a number of IT based strategies for avoiding, preventing
or recovering from loss [5]. These archives are engaged in
a process of long-term Digital Asset Management (DAM)
[11], specifically Media Asset Management (MAM), which
focuses on storing, cataloguing and retrieving digital AV
content. Several commercial tools exist to support the MAM
process, some of which support risk treatment strategies such
as keeping multiple copies of each file (redundancy). However,
these tools do not include a model of risk. The archive must
decide on risk indicators and define the way in which these
can be measured in order to monitor them, often using separate
tools to do so.
Based on the analysis of threats to digital preservation in
the DAVID project [7], [5], [12], it is clear that it is necessary
to manage the threats to the workflow processes themselves.
In this domain, we can note the following main sources
of risk: equipment and tools (hardware, services/systems,
software/algorithms), file formats (including implementations
of standards and variations between versions), processes and
human errors.
Workflows are often used to describe business processes
and, increasingly often, are used to automate some or all of
the process. Automated workflow execution is possible if the
process is specified in a machine-interpretable fashion, such
as using BPMN. In Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP),
risks are seen as inherent in processes, as individual steps may
fail, causing consequences for later parts of the process, or
if the process is not executed correctly. Risk-aware business
process management is critical for systems requiring high
integrity, such as archives.
A recent review of business process modelling and risk
management research has been conducted by Suriadi et
al. [13], identifying three parts to risk-aware business process
management:
• Static / design-time risk management: analyse risks
and incorporate risk mitigation strategies into a busi-
ness process model during design time (prior to exe-
cution).
• Run-time risk management: monitor the emergence
of risks and apply risk mitigation actions during
execution of the business process.
• Off-line risk management: identify risks from logs and
other post-execution artefacts, such that the business
process design can be improved.
Several approaches have been proposed to model business
processes and risk information such that it enables risk analy-
sis. Rosemann and zur Muehlen propose integrating process-
related risks into business process management by extending
Event-driven Process Chains (EPC) [14]. Risks are classified
according to a taxonomy including structural, technological
and organisational risks.
Analysis of process risks is difficult given that operational
risks are highly dependent on the specific (and changing)
business context. Many risks are caused by business decisions
(e.g., preservation selection strategy or migration path), so
large volumes of data required for statistical methods are often
not available for analysis. Those who subscribe to this thesis
use structural approaches, such as Bayesian networks, HA-
ZOP and influence diagrams. For example, Sienou et al. [15]
present a conceptual model of risk in an attempt to unify risk
management and business process management using a visual
modelling language.
In contrast to the above thesis, some believe that run-
time analysis of risks is possible with a suitably instrumented
execution process. Conforti et al. [16] propose a distributed
sensor-based approach to monitor risk indicators at run time.
Sensors are introduced into the business process at design time;
historical as well as current process execution data is taken into
account when defining the conditions that indicate that a risk
is likely to occur. These data can be used for run-time risk
management or off-line analysis.
Given that analysis of business processes using structured
and/or statistical approaches can reveal vulnerabilities, it is
important to control the risk that these vulnerabilities lead to
loss. Bai et al. [17] use Petri nets (a transition graph used to
represent distributed systems) and BPMN to model business
processes and to optimise the deployment of controls, such that
the economic consequences of errors (measured as Conditional
Value at Risk - CVaR) are minimised.
Using BPMN, the PrestoPRIME project described the
preservation workflows that were implemented in the preser-
vation planning tool iModel [18]. It has shown that tools are
required to model such generic preservation workflows in such
a way that they can be related to specific preservation processes
and augmented with information concerning risks.
IV. BUSINESS PROCESS RISK MANAGEMENT
FRAMEWORK
Here, we present a Business Process Risk management
framework (BPRisk) developed in the DAVID project (Section
IV-C), designed to support the aims and risk management
process discussed below in Sections IV-A and IV-B.
A. Aims of Risk Framework for Digital Preservation
Above, we have discussed the motivations for a risk
management of business processes, according to the wider
challenges in the domain of digital preservation. For digital
preservation / archive management, the key actor we are
addressing with the proposed risk framework is the preser-
vation expert / specialist, who is responsible for designing
workflows for managing and processing digital AV content.
We can summarise here some key value-added aims of a risk
management framework in the context of digital preservation:
1) Helping preservation experts develop new workflows,
especially the early stages of development. Note
that the purpose of the framework is not to replace
MAM tools (discussed in Section III, above), nor the
preservation experts, but to be a value-added tool to
assist them.
2) Helping preservation experts optimise workflows (in
terms of cost effectiveness and security), considering
also trade-offs where too many corners are cut (to
reduce cost), which may lead to increased risk.
3) Helping preservation experts communicate and justify
decisions about choices for elements in workflows.
This may be related to arguing expected financial
ROI of putting in place certain risk mitigations, for
example. By risk mitigation, we here refer to reducing
the likelihood or impact of risk.
4) Helping organisations change their processes, as the
risk arising from such changes is typically seen as
very high, which inhibits change. However, change is
necessary to address the issue of format obsolescence.
From an organisational point of view, some of the key reasons
to perform risk management can be summarised as follows:
1) Workflows can be large and complex. Therefore,
there can be too many variables and options for
preservation experts to consider simultaneously to
accurately estimate the potential impact of risk.
2) Risk information is typically in experts’ heads, which
is itself a risk from the organisation’s point of view.
The risk framework ensures that the knowledge is
captured and retained, and is readily available should
the organisation be subject to an audit or the expert
is unavailable or leaves the organisation.
3) Improve cost-benefit by a) identifying and under-
standing key vulnerabilities and b) targeting invest-
ments to address those vulnerabilities.
4) Move away from “firefighting”. That is, organisations
may spend more time dealing with issues rather than
preventing them in the first place. Risk management
is key to prevention, i.e., spending more time in the
planning stages to save time and cost on dealing with
issues in the future that could have been avoided.
It is important to note that the end users of the risk man-
agement framework in this context are unlikely to be risk
experts. They are domain (preservation) experts, and they will
be acutely aware of a wide range of potential issues concerning
the preservation workflows they manage. However, the term
risk and explicitly managing risk may be entirely unfamiliar
and it is important that the risk management framework is
suitably designed to aid the domain experts (rather than simply
being a risk registry).
B. Risk Management Process
The risk framework should support a process that promotes
best practices to address the aims discussed above in order to
reduce the risks to long-term preservation. There is a natural
focus on the planning aspects regarding risk management, but
we do need to consider the wider context as well.
Several risk standards and methodologies exist, but it is
not within the scope here to discuss them in detail. However,
we will make reference to one in particular here, ISO 31000
[10], to show how it relates to a risk management approach
proposed here based on the Deming cycle. The Deming cycle
is a four-step iterative method commonly used for control and
continuous improvement of processes and products. The four
steps are: Plan, Do, Check and Act. For this reason it is also
commonly referred to as the PDCA cycle, and is key to, for
example, ITIL Continual Service Improvement [19]. In general
terms, risk management is a part of continual improvement of
processes – preservation workflows in this context.
The ISO 31000 [10] risk management methodology is
depicted in Figure 1, below, which depicts the various stages
from ‘establishing the context’ to ‘treatment’ (of risk) that is
also cyclic. Supporting continual improvement of workflow
processes is imperative in digital preservation, as discussed
in Section II, as one of the key challenges in this domain
is obsolescence and one of the key current risk strategies
involving file-replication may not be feasible in the future.
Figure 1. ISO 31000 risk management process.
Given the aims discussed above, each of the four stages
of the Deming cycle is covered below from the perspective of
what a user (preservation expert) would do, with reference to
the related stages of the ISO 31000 methodology).
Plan (‘establishing the context’ and ‘identification’ stages
of ISO 31000): build workflows, capture risk information,
simulate workflow execution scenarios to identify key vulner-
abilities and estimate impact of risk, and make decisions.
Do (‘analysis’ stage of ISO 31000): execute business
process, orchestrate services, and record execution meta-data.
Check (‘evaluation’ stage of ISO 31000): analyse workflow
execution meta-data and process analytics, calibrate simula-
tions and trigger live alerts.
Act (‘treatment’ stage of ISO 31000 as well as feedback
and loop-back to the previous stages): adapt workflows and
manage risk. Re-run simulations (Plan), enacting the offline
changes in the real business process and continues execution
(Do) and monitoring (Check).
Note also how this relates to the three risk-aware busi-
ness processes discussed above from Suriadi et al. [13];
static/design-time risk management (Plan), run-time risk man-
agement (Do) and off-line risk management (Check). The final
step in the Deming cycle, Act, covers multiple processes.
C. Risk Components
Based on the above aims, a high level component view
of the BPRisk framework developed in the DAVID project is
depicted in Figure 2. This framework integrates both new com-
ponents developed in the DAVID project as well as existing
open source technologies, which is discussed below.
BPRisk Dashboard: The main entry point for the user from
which the user can access the functionalities of the framework,
e.g., to create workflows, specify risks, run and view risk
simulation results, etc. Figure 2 also shows two vocabularies
used, one for known domain-specific risk and one for domain
specific activities. This is discussed further below.
Workflow Designer: There are several existing, mature,
tools for this, supporting the well-known BPMN 2.0 stan-
dard, such as Signavio Decision Manager [20] and the jBPM
Figure 2. BPRisk framework high level component view.
Designer [21]. The latter has been adopted in the BPRisk
framework as it is available as open source.
Workflow Store: This is a component to persist any work-
flows created, updated or imported. Existing tools, such as
jBPM come with multiple persistence options and a RESTful
API for accessing and managing the workflows.
Risk Editor: As described above, this component is respon-
sible for allowing users to specify risks. As discussed earlier in
this paper, the end-users of this system are not likely to be risk
experts. Therefore, the Risk Editor utilises the two vocabularies
mentioned above in a semantic risk model, which is used to aid
users in specifying risks. See Section V for further discussion.
BPRisk Store: This is a component for persisting risk
specifications and risk simulation results (a connection from
the Simulation Centre has not been depicted in Figure 2 for
the sake of simplifying the diagram).
Simulation Centre: This is a component for managing
the running of simulation models for workflows annotated
with risk information. This component deals with configuring
different simulation scenarios and allows users to visualise and
compare the results.
Simulation Model: A stochastic risk simulation model that
the Simulation Centre can execute. This component simulates
executions of the workflow process and the occurrences of
risks defined for the workflow activities. As output, the simula-
tion model gives information on, for example, risk occurrences,
time and cost spent on risk, and impact of risk.
Risk Feedback Centre: A component for getting data from
real workflow executions that can be used to a) analyse the
workflow execution meta-data and b) to modify/adapt/calibrate
the workflows (e.g., risk details) and simulation configurations
to improve the accuracy for future simulation scenarios.
Workflow Execution: An external software component to
the BPRisk framework, which would be invoked to execute a
workflow process. This is a source of workflow execution data
for the Risk Feedback Centre.
D. Implementation and Integration
A BPRisk framework prototype has been implemented as a
RESTful [22] web application using Java Spring [23]. Figure 3
shows an architecture diagram of the key components that are
in scope of this paper.
Web services are denoted with [WAR], comprising the
BPRisk web application itself, a simulation service, the jBPM
Designer (with Guvnor for workflow storage) and a Sesame
service for the OWLim triple store used. The BPRisk web ap-
plication follows a Model-View-Controller (MVC) [24] design
pattern, comprising a shared data model (not discussed here),
a control layer (blue) and view components for User Interface
(UI) interactions with the users. Due to the MVC RESTful
approach taken, it is possible for external client applications
to access the data services, such as workflow data, in way
that allows flexible compsition of relevant information for the
end-user.
As noted above, the jBPM Designer has been integrated
for workflow design, i.e., to graphically create new workflows
or editing existing workflows. It supports the BPMN 2.0
standard, which allows users to specify workflows using, e.g.,
events (such as ‘start’ and ‘end’), activities and connections
between the activities, such as sequence flows or gateways
to represent process logic. Figure 11 gives an example of a
BPMN workflow using exclusive OR gateways.
The jBPM Designer uses the jBPM Guvnor as a workflow
store by default, which has been adopted in BPRisk. However,
to enable integration with other workflow management tools,
the BPRisk framework has been designed such that workflow
data is accessed via the Risk Data Service API, as depicted
in Figure 3. More details are shown in Figure 4. A generic
‘Workflow Accessor’ component communicates with a specific
workflow accessor module that functions as an adaptor. Here,
a ‘Guvnor Accessor’ is shown, which will make a call to
the Guvnor Service via its REST API in order to manage
workflow information. Within the Risk Data Service API,
the workflow data from Guvnor is processed via an ‘Activiti
BPMN parser’ [25] before workflow information is returned
in a shared BPRisk data model format (activities, gates and
flows).
There are three different data storages depicted in the Risk
Data Service API layer:
1) Workflow Store: for persisting and accessing the
BPMN workflows, using the jBPM Guvnor as dis-
cussed above.
2) BPRisk Semantic Store: for storing semantic data
pertaining to workflows, linking with controlled vo-
cabularies for risks and domain specific activities,
enabling semantic reasoning to aid users in creating
or optimising their workflows.
3) BPRisk Project Store: for storing all other BPRisk
data, including workflow projects, users, simulation
configurations and simulation results.
A risk simulation model has been implemented in Matlab
Simulink [26]. This has been integrated via a separate web
service, to enable modularity and scalability as simulations
can be computationally heavy. More details of the simulation
modelling is provided in Section VI, followed by a discussion
of simulation results in Section VII.
V. SEMANTIC RISK MODELLING
The BPRisk framework utilises a semantic risk model for
specifying and reasoning about risks associated with workflow
Figure 3. BPRisk architecture diagram.
Figure 4. BPRisk workflow API.
activities. The modelling approach is generic in nature, utilis-
ing a multi-level ontology to include domain specific workflow
activities and risks.
A. Modelling Approach
The BPRisk ontology represents information related to
risks, controls and activities. This representation allows flex-
ibility and extensibility of the risk model. It can be easily
published (e.g., as a set of OWL files), and can be extended
in unexpected ways. For example, the BPRisk ontology allows
for the possibility of injecting provenance based information
that can provide an auditable trail linking the identification of
a risk factor (related to a workflow element) to its subsequent
treatment using a provenance based ontology such as W3C
PROV [27].
The approach to building the ontology is based on work
done in the SERSCIS project [28]. The authors use a layered,
class-based ontology model to represent knowledge about
security threats, assets and controls. Each layer inherits from
the layer above. The CORE layer describes the relationships
between a central triad (threat, asset, control). A domain
security expert creates sub-classes for each of these core
concepts to create a GENERIC layer. A system expert further
sub-classes the generic concepts to specialise them for the
system of interest, creating the SYSTEM layer. Note that this
ontology was used in the context of modelling systems and
interactions between system components, where it is assumed
that a system of a particular type is always subject to the threats
identified by the security and system experts. This expert
knowledge, therefore, helps the system designer create more
secure systems as they may not have this expert knowledge
themselves.
The same, layered, ontological approach has been taken
Figure 5. Workflow risk ontology layers.
here, as illustrated in Figure 5, though with a few modifica-
tions. While the triad in the CORE layer in SERSCIS includes
Asset, there is only one asset of value in this context – the
digital AV object, which can be affected by different Activities
in a workflow process (e.g., ingest, storage and transcoding).
The term Threat used in SERSCIS can be understood as Risk in
this context. Therefore, the CORE layer in BPRisk comprises
a triad of Risk, Activity and Control.
The GENERIC layer from SERSCIS has been renamed to
the DOMAIN layer here, as it better reflects the level at which
knowledge of domain specific (generic) activities and risks are
represented. It is at this level, we incorporate controlled domain
vocabularies, which are discussed further below in Section
V-C. This layer can be further extended via the SYSTEM layer
by users of the BPRisk application.
B. Model Definition
The model focuses on the Activities in the preservation
life cycle and the Risks that are inherent in their execution.
Controls can be put in place to block or mitigate these Risks.
The CORE layer comprises Risk, Activity and Control, as well
as basic relationships such as ‘Risk threatens Activity’ and
‘Control protects Activity’. However, the relationship between
Control and Risk is established via rules that abstractly encode
how types or super-types of both controls and risks can be
linked together (see the following section), to determine the
appropriate relationship. That is, a Risk is only considered Mit-
igated if an appropriate Control is in place. This is illustrated
below in Figure 6.
The DOMAIN layer has been developed in the DAVID
project for digital preservation, which describes common
preservation activities, risks and controls. These are mod-
elled as sub-classes, which can be quite hierarchical. As an
example, the DOMAIN level classes in Figure 6 include
three sub-classed Activities, ‘Migration’, ‘Digital Migration’
and ‘Transcoding’, with an associated risk ‘Migration Fails’.
Migration in this context refers to converting content in one
format into another format. Digital migration refers to convert-
ing older analogue content into digital form.
The SYSTEM layer is a further extensible part that would
be populated by the users of the BPRisk framework when
they build a workflow of specific Activities and associate
Risks to them. For example, a migration workflow may use
a specific transcoding tool such as FFmpeg [29], which may
have specific technical risks not covered by the more generic
‘Transcoding’ activity. Thus, a ‘FFmpeg Transcoding’ activity
Figure 6. BPRisk ontology with sub-classing examples. CORE layer entities
depicted in white and DOMAIN layer entities in grey.
may be added as a sub-class of ‘Transcoding’ (see Figure 6).
This sub-classing is important, as we can reason about risks
throughout the hierarchy, as discussed further in Section V-D.
C. Controlled Vocabularies
In order to enhance the usability of the BPRisk framework,
expert domain knowledge is included via the DOMAIN layer
of the ontology presented above in Section V-B. The domain
knowledge is incorporated via two controlled vocabularies: 1)
known domain activities; 2) known risks and controls to the
aforementioned activities.
Although the controlled vocabularies reside within one of
the three logical layers in the BPRisk ontology, there can be
an extensive hierarchy of entries, which is depicted in Figure
7a. For example, we can see that ‘Transcoding’ is a type of
‘Digital Migration’ which is a type of ‘Migration’ activity.
Further, for each activity, the controlled risk vocabulary defines
common risks and controls for the known activities, such as
for the ‘Digital Migration’ activity, as depicted in Figure 7b.
For further details of the activities, risks and controls in the
controlled vocabularies, interested readers are referred to [5].
When a user defines a workflow in the BPRisk framework,
the domain knowledge embedded in the semantic model is
used as follows. First, the activities from the BPMN workflow
are extracted via the Risk Data Service API (see Figure 4).
The user then maps each BPMN activity to activities in the
BPRisk ontology (using the controlled activity vocabulary).
Following this, the user will retrieve suggestions of potential
risks, as per the controlled risk vocabulary. For example, for
a ‘Digital Migration’ activity, the users will be presented with
five possible risks, two of which are inherited from the parent
activity ‘Migration’, as depicted in Figure 7b. The users can
then chose which risks apply to the specific activity in the
respective workflow.
As noted above, users are also able to add new risks,
activities and controls not reflected in the DOMAIN layer.
These user-specific additions form part of the SYSTEM layer,
(a) Hierarchy of Migration activities.
(b) Risks for the Digital Migration activity.
Figure 7. Examples from controlled vocabularies.
extending the knowledge repository. This knowledge is then
available to users when working on other workflows. In the
following section, we delve into further details on how this
functionality is achieved via semantic reasoning.
D. Semantic Reasoning
Providing expert knowledge to users of the BPRisk frame-
work is achieved via semantic reasoning, which is performed
according to pre-defined rules.
Rule Composition: The layered abstractions CORE, DO-
MAIN and SYSTEM in the BPRisk model provide a useful
framework within which to characterise generally increasing
levels of specialism with respect to workflow activities and
their associated risks and controls. Aligned with this arrange-
ment, the rules that create relationships between activities,
risks and controls are also expressible within and between
these layers. For example, during a video migration activity
a risk exists that the copies (that is, the migrated video) will
not match the source material. This simple rule is expressed
as using the Turtle RDF formalism [30]:
:CopiesDoNotMatch a owl:Class ;
rdfs:subClassOf core:Risk ;




This risk is applied generally in the DOMAIN level and also
to activities derived from the migration type - these include
analogue transfer recording; digital migration and digitisation
activities (as seen in Figure 7a, above). Workflows that include
activities that belong to (or are themselves specialities of)
this type will automatically generate an instance of this risk
when processed by the BPRisk framework. Having identified
a risk, one or more controls should be put in place to manage
its potential outcomes. Here, the knowledge encapsulated in
BPRisk rules can also be used. Activities are said to be
‘protected’ by controls that are available to manage risk;
one very simple protection against a copy mismatch during
migration would be to first check the migration
:CheckMigration a owl:Class ;
rdfs:subClassOf core:Control ;




and second, re-do the migration, if required:
:RedoMigration a owl:Class ;
rdfs:subClassOf core:Control ;








Both of these control measures would be suggested by the
BPRisk framework when the ‘copies do not match’ risk is
detected. Sometimes more specific knowledge is available that
enhances the more general control procedures offered by the
framework. In our example, those specific to protecting digital
migration activities would be suggested. Below we see that re-
introducing missing meta-data is a possible solution for risks
threatening digital migration.
:ReintroduceMissingMetadata a owl:Class ;
rdfs:subClassOf core:Control ;




When a risk has been identified and controls put in place they
can be marked up as either blocked or mitigated.
Rule Encapsulation: Encapsulating the relationships be-
tween risks, controls and activities are ultimately encoded as
risk classification rules within the ontology knowledge based
itself, using SPIN [31]. From a technical point of view, this
provides a more flexible method of extending and executing
rules incurring zero or only minimal changes to the compiled
source used to operate on the results. Running inferencing
over the model automatically applies the classification and can
also determine the revised state of a workflow when control
procedures have been put in place. In our earlier example, we
considered the application of controls to act in the presence
of risks threatening migration activity. In the SPIN formalism
below, we express the fact that the control check migration
blocks the copies do not match risk that is generated in the

























sp:subject [ sp:varName "c"^^xsd:string ; ] ;
]
[
sp:object [ sp:varName "a"^^xsd:string ; ] ;
sp:predicate core:threatens ;
sp:subject [ sp:varName "r"^^xsd:string ; ] ;
]
[
sp:object [ sp:varName "a"^^xsd:string ; ] ;
sp:predicate core:protects ;
sp:subject [ sp:varName "c"^^xsd:string ; ] ;
] ) ;
] ;
rdfs:subClassOf :RiskClassificationRules ; .
In running SPIN rules every time the knowledge about specific
workflow activities (contained in the SYSTEM layer) is added
we are able to automatically recognise, control and manage
risks in a pro-active manner.
As noted above, the SYSTEM layer is developed so that
it sub-classes the DOMAIN layer for a specific organisation
using the BPRisk framework, as seen above in Figure 6. This
should specify the kind of activity in the preservation work-
flow of interest, e.g., sub-class Migration as DigitalMigration
as seen above in the examples from the DOMAIN layer.
Workflow-specific risks can then be automatically generated;
for example, the following is a generic construction rule to
generate all risks:
CONSTRUCT {
?uri a owl:Class .
?uri rdfs:subClassOf ?gr .
?uri rdfs:subClassOf _:b0 .
_:b0 a owl:Restriction .
_:b0 owl:onProperty core:threatens .
_:b0 owl:someValuesFrom ?sa .
} WHERE {
?sa (rdfs:subClassOf)+ act:Activity .
?sa rdfs:subClassOf ?ga .
?gr rdfs:subClassOf core:Risk .
?gr rdfs:subClassOf ?restriction1 .
?restriction1 owl:onProperty core:threatens .
?restriction1 owl:someValuesFrom ?ga .
FILTER NOT EXISTS {





"_", STRAFTER(str(?sa), "#")) AS ?newclass) .
BIND (URI(fn:concat(fn:concat(STRBEFORE(str(?sa),
"#"), "#"), ?newclass)) AS ?uri) .
}
This rule finds all activities in the SYSTEM layer and creates
a workflow-specific risk for each of the DOMAIN layer risks
that threaten the activities’ parent class. The name of the
workflow-specific risk in this example is generated by con-
catenation of the DOMAIN layer risk name and the workflow-
specific activity name.
E. Discussion
The purpose of the semantic modelling in the BPRisk
framework, as mentioned earlier in this paper, is to support
the end-users who are typically not risk experts in optimising
and building more robust workflows in order to ensure the
long-term value of their digital content.
Formal representation of domain knowledge (linking activi-
ties, risks and controls) using the BPRisk semantic framework
confers upon its users the ability to encapsulate and opera-
tionalise expertise in the preservation of media in the context
of workflow based processes. Knowledge is structured in terms
of i) hierarchies that are capable of expressing general and
specialisations of cases (activities or risks) and ii) bespoke
networks of connected activities, risks and controls that com-
bine to form rules that flexibly express scenarios applicable to
a wide range of workflows. In the example provided above,
we explore this ability in the scenario where a risk is mapped
to the type (and sub-types) of migration. Here this specific
risk is defined as relevant in the context of migration type
activities and is managed by a particular recommended control.
However, note that the same risk type may also be applicable
to other unrelated activities but may not call for the same
controls. Managing risk using this formalism, thus, offers the
user customisable responses to risk depending on the activity
in hand. This has been made possible through the use of an
ontological approach to knowledge engineering in which RDF
and SPIN technologies have been used to build a knowledge
base that is readily extensible by end-users (via the BPRisk
Dashboard user interface). This approach, therefore, adds value
to media workflow assets by augmenting them with expertise
that can be queried and refined at design time, then tested
and updated (through simulation and feedback from real-world
exectuion, as described in the following section).
A large part of the knowledge base described here is
particular to media workflow risk management. However, the
application of the BPRisk framework is not limited to this
enterprise and could be applied to other problem domains
in which risk within workflows play a significant role. The
underlying BPRisk architecture and services would remain
the same, but it should be noted that a significant initial
effort would be required to capture and transform knowledge
gathered from experts in order to populate the domain layer
of the ontology with common activities, risks and controls.
VI. SIMULATION MODELLING
In this section, we present the work done on workflow
risk simulation modelling, which is an integral part of the
BPRisk framework. In respective sections below, we discuss
the purpose of the simulation modelling, the risk impact model,
the risk generation model and risk control procedures. There-
after, in Section VII, we will present results from simulation
modelling on a workflow at ORF, the Austrian Broadcasting
Corporation.
A. Purpose of Simulation
The purpose of risk simulation modelling is to help an or-
ganisation to reduce cost by designing or optimising workflows
in order to reduce the likelihood or impact of risks occurring.
For example, it could be used to help justify expenses on
technology and quality control tools, showing the anticipated
cost of dealing with issues (risks) when they are not addressed
(controlled) versus the cost of preventing them. The costs may
be less, so we can say there is a ROI. The simulations can
help identify the key vulnerabilities in a workflow and to help
target investments.
The aim is to expose issues at design-time before a work-
flow is actually executed. In this paper, the risk simulation
addresses issues that could occur in activities conducted in
preservation workflows. There could be technical risks, such
as a system operation failing, or human errors such as mistakes
being done because the person is overloaded by too much
content to deal with.
To this end, a stochastic risk management model was
developed. This model allows users to simulate different
scenarios and to produce confidence intervals for different risk
measures, if required, by means of Monte Carlo simulations.
Moreover, the stochastic model allows end-users to explore
‘what if’ scenarios and can be used both during planning and
operation stages. The proposed stochastic risk management
model consists of three main parts:
• Risk Impact Model.
• Risk Generation Model.
• Risk Control Procedures.
Below we describe each of these parts in detail.
B. Risk Impact Model
To classify possible risks (threats) in digital preservation,
we have adopted the Simple Property-Oriented Threat
model (SPOT) for Risk Assessment. The SPOT model
[32] defines six essential properties of successful digital
preservation: Availability, Identity, Persistence, Renderability,
Understandability, and Authenticity. Interested readers are
referred to the original article for details. However we will
give a short definitions of each property and list threats
associated with this property.
Availability is the property that a digital object is available
for long-term use. Threats:
• A digital object deteriorated beyond restoration power.
• Only part of the digital object is available for preser-
vation.
• A digital objects is not available for preservation due
to disappearing, cannot be located or withheld.
Identity is the property of being referenceable. A limited
amount of metadata is required for this property. Threats:
• Sufficient metadata is not captured or maintained.
• Linkages between the object and its metadata are not
captured or maintained.
• Metadata is not available to users.
Persistence is the property that the bit sequences continue to
exist in usable/processable state and are retrievable/processable
from the stored media. Threats:
• Improper/negligent handling or storage.
• Useful life of storage medium is exceeded.
• Equipment necessary to read medium is unavailable.
• Malicious or/and Inadvertent damage to medium
and/or bit sequence.
Renderability is the property that a digital object is able to be
used in a way that retains the object’s significant characteristics
(content, context, appearance, and behaviour). Threats:
• An appropriate combination of hardware and software
is not available, cannot be operated or maintained.
• The appropriate rendering environment is unknown.
• Verification that a rendering of an object retains
significant characteristics of the original cannot be
done (e.g., a repository is unable to perform sufficient
quality assurance on migration due to volume).
• Object characteristics important to stakeholders are
incorrectly identified and therefore not preserved.
Understandability requires associating enough supplementary
information with archived digital content such that the content
can be appropriately interpreted and understood by its intended
users. Threats:
• The interest of one or more groups of intended users
are not considered.
• Sufficient supplementary information for all groups of
intended users is not obtained or archived.
• The entire representation network is not obtained or
archived.
• Representation network of supplementary information
is damaged or otherwise not renderable in whole or
in part.
Authenticity is the property that that a digital object, either as
a bitstream or in its rendered form, is what it purports to be.
Threats:
• Metadata and/or documentation are not captured.
• Metadata maliciously or erroneously describes the
object as something it is not.
• A digital object is altered during the period of archival
retention (legitimately, maliciously or erroneously),
and this change goes unrecorded.
Since not all possible threats/risks in digital preservation
workflows will fall in the six properties mentioned above, we
introduce an extra possible state in the SPOT model for such
cases: Other.
C. Risk Generation Model
The stochastic risk generation model is based on simulating
a workflow in which risks associated with workflow activities
take place based on risk occurrence probabilities and
dependencies between risks. Dependencies between risks can
be within a single activity or between consecutive activities.
Below, we given an overview of the data that is needed for
workflow simulation, divided into the following categories
for convenience: general, workflow-related, risk-related,
control-related and other simulation parameters.
General data:
• The purpose of the workflow under consideration.
That is, what the workflow does, inputs and outputs
to/from the workflow.
• The objectives of risk analysis for this workflow.
Workflow-related data:
• List of activities in the workflow, a short description
of each activity, and how the activities are connected
between each other.
• Decision points in the workflow, and based on records
or previous experience how often each decision are
usually made at each decision point (e.g., at decision
point 1, D1 will be made approximately 90% of the
time and D2 10% of the time).
Risk-related data (for each activity):
• List of risks (threats) which can take place and their
descriptions.
• Any dependencies between the risks in the same
activity and/or risks from different activities. E.g., can
the risks in the same activity occur simultaneously?
• Frequency of each risk occurrence, either from records
or estimated based on the previous experience; fre-
quencies of more than one risk taken place in a activity
if relevant; any changes in frequency of occurrence
of some risk in the activity if other risk in the same
activity took place.
• For each risk
◦ Probability (frequency) of occurrence.
◦ Detection level (if known).
◦ Negative impact on workflow measured in
monetary values, percentages or some impact
scale.
◦ Affected SPOT properties (explained further
below).
• If combination of risks can occur:
◦ Frequency of combined occurrence.
◦ Multiplication factor, which is used to update
the probability of a risk if combinations of
risks occur either in the same or previous
activity.
Control-related data (for each risk):
• Is anything done on the fly (Ad-Hoc Control)? If yes,
is the Ad-Hoc Control procedure covered by bud-
get overheads? How effective is the Ad-Hoc Control
procedure (a value for ‘Expected Success’ would be
provided)?
• Are Active Control procedures available for a given
risk and activity? If so, is there a delay before the
Active Control takes place?
• List all other control procedures dealing with this risk
and their effectiveness.
• If more than one procedure dealing with risk is avail-
able, describe conditions when different procedures
are activated.
• List costs associated dealing with risk and time spent
on dealing with risk.
• Describe how negative impact is reduced when Ad-
Hoc or/and other control procedures are applied.
Other simulation parameters:
• Number of items to be processed through a workflow.
• Annual throughput of items.
• Number of items to be processed during a day, week,
month or year.
The risk occurrence probability is calculated based on the
Estimated Frequencies (EFs) of risks provided by a user. We
assume here, that EFs of risks are based on a pre-defined
annual throughput of a given workflow, and, therefore, a risk
occurrence is simulated on a per item basis. If a pre-defined
annual throughput of the workflow changes, the new estimated
frequencies can be updated using Estimated Frequency Factor
(EFF) provided by the user. For example, if we are interested in
processing N items per month, which is equivalent to 12×N
items per year, then the EF for risk i in activity j can be
calculated as:
EFnew(i, j) = 12×N × EFF (i, j) (1)
where EFF (i, j) is the Estimated Frequency Factor for
risk i in activity j.
EFnew(i, j) represents a frequency per year in this form.
The probability of risk occurrence based on EF per
item can be calculated as follows.




where EF is the estimated frequency based on a pre-
defined throughput for a given workflow in pD (per day), pW
(per week), pM (per month) and pY (per year).
Nitems corresponds to a number of items that can be
processed in a day/week/month/year, based on this pre-defined
throughput.
If the throughput of items is changed, then instead of
EF , EFnew will be used in conjunction with new values pY,
pM , pW and pD.
By the nature of dependency between risk occurrences,
all risks can be divided in the following groups:
1) Risks do not have any known dependency between
each other and it is assumed that they cannot occur
simultaneously.
2) The frequency of one risk in a given activity changes
temporally if another risk in this activity took place.
In this case these risks can occur simultaneously.
Otherwise, both of the risks can occur only one by
one (mutually exclusive).
3) The frequency of Risk A in the next activity changes
temporally if Risk B in the previous activity occurs.
This situation will be modelled as follows: if Risk B
took place, then the frequency of Risk A is changed
accordingly (for a single run of the workflow).
4) The risks can occur simultaneously. In this case the
frequencies of each risk and the frequency of risks
occurring simultaneously are used to simulate such a
situation. In this case ‘Estimated Frequency’ means
that only a given risk took place, ‘Frequency of
Combined’ shows the joint frequency of risks.
The identification of risk generation groups will be done
automatically by checking corresponding values in order of
priority:
1) Multiple Risk-Entry per Activity.
2) Multiplication Factor.
3) Frequency of Combined.
A Detection Level parameter allows us to simulate whether a
risk was detected or not. If risk is detected, then procedure
dealing with risk will be put in action (see the next section).
Otherwise we mark affected SPOT properties and record
level of Negative Consequences (NC). An example of risk
specification and related simulation configuration is given in
Table I.
D. Risk Control Procedures
The stochastic risk management model implements a pro-
cedure of dealing with risk that comprises two types of
controls: Ad-Hoc Control and Active Control. These controls
only apply if a risk is actually detected. The schematic presen-
tation of Risk Control procedures is shown in Figure 8. If a
risk is detected, then the Ad-Hoc Control procedure is started.
Active Control is applied only if a cost spent on an Ad-Hoc
Control procedure is higher than a pre-defined value. This is
generally only likely to be issued for large and significant risks
and could be, for example, re-training staff or allocating more
resources. This type of control would typically incur additional
cost and time to be put into place. However, note that Active
Control is not necessarily available for all activities/risks. In
this case only the Ad-Hoc Control procedure is applied to
dealing with those risks.
Figure 8. High level risk control flow chart. For simplicity, negative
consequences are not shown, but do occur along with ‘SPOT impact’.
Similarly, time spent on dealing with risk is omitted; just referring to
financial cost.
The details of the Ad-Hoc Control procedure are illustrated
in Figure 9. It can be covered by overhead or not. Overhead
is a term used here for either a budget or a percentage of
resources set aside a priori to cover the cost of dealing with
issues. If not covered by overheads, it will result in cost and
time spent with dealing with the risk. However, if the Ad-
Hoc Control procedure is covered by overhead and has 100%
Expected Success of Ad-Hoc counter-measures, then a) the
risk does not have any effects on the assets properties (SPOT
model) or Negative Consequences and b) there are no (extra)
costs associated with dealing with the risk.
If the Expected Success of the Ad-Hoc Control procedure is
not 100%, then, based on the number of items to be processed
Figure 9. Ad-Hoc Control procedure flow chart. For simplicity, negative
consequences are not shown, but do occur along with ‘SPOT impact’.
Similarly, time spent on dealing with risk is omitted; just referring to
financial cost.
through the workflow and Excepted Success rate, additional
Ad-Hoc Control procedures are performed as follows.
1) For up to 10 items: the 1st attempt of the Ad-Hoc
Control procedure always successful independent of
the Expected Success rate provided for the respective
risk.
2) For 11 to 100 items: 2nd attempt will be always
successful if the Expected Success rate is 50% or
above. 3 attempts will have to be made otherwise to
achieve success.
3) For 101 to 1,000 items: 3rd attempt will be needed
to reduce the Negative Consequences to zero.
Note that, in this case, the Ad-Hoc Control procedure is
performed until Negative Consequences is zero or near zero.
In general, the number of attempts needed is equal to the order
of the number of items to be processed via the workflow. Let
us take an example:
A risk is detected for 500 items, and we have a 90%
Expected Success rate for this risk.
This means the 1st attempt will resolve the issue for 450
items → 50 items remaining.
The remaining 50 items are subject to a 2nd attempt → 5
items remaining.
The remaining 5 items are then subject to a 3rd and final
attempt, and for up to 10 items, we have modelled the attempt
to have a 100% success rate, regardless of the value provided
for the Expected Success rate.
For each attempt, time and cost is accumulated, and it is
this sum that is subject to the Active Control check; i.e., if
this exceeds some pre-defined threshold.
The general formula for calculating costs of the Ad-Hoc
Control procedure is as follows:
TABLE I. Risk specification example.
TSM Retrieve Mapping Control
Wrong file selected Retrieve fails Overload Wrong assessment
Estimated Frequency 5 per year 5 per year 2 per month 2 per month
Estimated Frequency Factor 0.0004166 0.0004166 0.002 0.001
Multiplication Factor 1 1 1 5
Multiple Risk Entry per
Activity No No Yes Yes
Frequency of combined None None None None
Detection Level 90% 100% 100% 75%
Level of Severity 1 1 2 2
Expected Success of Ad-Hoc
counter-measures 100% 90% 50% 90%
Cost associated with Risk
(CAR per hour) C50 C50 C70 C50
Time spent on dealing with risk
(TAR per item) 0.1 hrs 0.2 hrs 0.5 hrs 0.2 hrs
Cost for Active Control strategy
(CACS) C800 None C1,000 C800






Delay of Active Control (days) 5 0 5 22
SPOT Availability 1 1 1 1
SPOT Identity 0 0 0 0
SPOT Persistence 0 0 0 0
SPOT Renderability 0 0 0 0
SPOT Understandability 0 0 0 0
SPOT Authenticity 1 0 1 1




where TAR is the time needed for dealing with risk for
one affected item,
CAR is a cost associated with dealing with risk for 1 hour
TAR.
k is a number of attempts of the Ad-Hoc Control procedure
calculated as described above, based on a number of items
passing through the workflow.
ni is a number of affected items after each Ad-Hoc effort
calculated as a product of the number of affected items before
the ith attempt and (1 - success rate of Ad-Hoc) in decimal
points.
Active Control is applied only if a cost spent on Ad-
Hoc Control exceeds a pre-defined allocation of available
resources for Ad-Hoc Control (CACS). Active Control does
not need to be defined for all activities/risks. However, if
Active Control is available then a check is needed for its
activation. The activation of Active Control is possible after
any number of Ad-Hoc Control procedures according to the
following formula:
[TAR× CAR× (ni + nr)]× k > CACS (4)
where k is an activation coefficient.
ni is the number of affected items in the ith Ad-Hoc
attempt.
nr is the number of remaining items that have to be
processed during delay of Active Control.
An additional check has to be performed if nr < PID2 ,
then Active Control is suspended (called off) even if the
condition in Equation (4) holds. PID is a number of items
which can be processed during delay of Active Control. For
example, if ‘Delay of Active Control’ is 1 week, PID = 230.
Then, if after 1 Ad-Hoc Control procedure, 100 affected items
are left, no Active Control is activated.
If the condition in Equation (4) is true, then Active Control
will be applied. Otherwise the Ad-Hoc Control procedure is
used. In case of applying the Ad-Hoc Control procedure, NC
= 0 and no SPOT properties are affected. Since Active Control
incurs a delay, the cost of dealing with risk is calculated as
follows:
costrisk = costad−hoc + costad−hoc−pid + CACS (5)
where costad−hoc is the cost of the Ad-Hoc Control
procedure before the activation of Active Control.
costad−hoc−pid is the cost of the Ad-Hoc Control
procedure during delay before Active Control has effect.
Active control will be activated for a given activity only if
a sufficiently large number of items will pass through an
activity. For the example workflow scenario discussed in
the following section, a threshold of 100 files was chosen
according to the practices at ORF.
VII. BPRISK APPLICATION AND RESULTS
In this section, we give an example of how the BPRisk
framework has been applied in the design of a workflow
in collaboration with the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation,
ORF. Respective sections below present a workflow, simulation
scenarios, results from simulation modelling and an discussion
by ORF to evaluate the accuracy and value of the simulation
results.
A. MXF Workflow
Within the DAVID project, the BPRisk framework has
been developed with use cases from both the French National
Archive (INA) and the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation
(ORF), such as planning for migration of old, analogue,
content into new, digital, formats (digital migration). Here,
we include an example of the use of BPRisk in the planning
of an MXF Repair workflow at ORF, which has been used
within the DAVID project for validation purposes. MXF is
an abbreviation for a file format; Material eXchange Format.
The standard for its use is ambiguous in places and some
tool implementations are inconsistent. The result is format
compatibility issues, i.e., the files may not standard compliant
and, therefore, may not be possible to play in the future.
The MXF workflow uses a service called CubeWorkflow [33],
which analyses media files for compatibility issues at the file
wrapper and bit stream levels. For this scenario MPEG-2 [34]
encoded (bit stream) MXF (wrapper) D-10 (SMPTE 356M)
[35] files were used. A logical view of the different layers of
a digital AV file is illustrated in Figure 10. After the workflow
design (planning) was completed, the workflow was executed
and the results of the planning could be compared with the
monitoring data collected during its execution (see Section
VII-D, below).
Figure 10. Logical view of layered structure of AV files.
The MXF Repair workflow is depicted in Figure 11, which
consists of 9 activities and 2 exclusive OR gateways (both
pertaining to points where errors may be detected and handled)
Each activity is briefly described as follows:
TSM Retrieve: an activity representing the retrieval (down-
load) of MXF files from a Tivoli Storage Management system
(TSM; an LTO tape based IT storage unit).
CubeTec Repair Server Input-Share: network storage on the
CubeTec Repair Server to store the retrieved MXF files from
the previous activity in order to be processed by the Cube
Workflow system.
Cube Workflow: this activity represents a black-box of the
Cube Workflow system executing a general analysis (of the
Wrapper and Streams) of the MXF files in the INPUT-Share
(previous activity). This analysis will detect relevant file errors,
attempt to repair errors, and conduct a final control/analysis
check of the repaired files. The MXF files passing the final
check will be transferred to the ESYS Input-Share.
ESYS Input-Share: network storage in the ESYS Server-
framework to gather files for Upload. ESYS = Essence Storage
System (by IBM), used by ORF.
Upload: general storage step of ESYS, where MXF files are
written to LTO tapes in ESYS and registered in FESAD (the
TV Archives MAM), including the production and registration
of preview files and keyframe light tables.
Mapping Control: this activity is a manual quality control
of the automatic mapping results from the upload process,
which is conducted by a person. This is done by comparing
the file content (video, audio) with the descriptive metadata in
the FESAD entry.
Repair: this is an optional step, if the previous Mapping
Control revealed a mapping error; manual “reallocation” of
the affected file(s) from the wrong FESAD entry to the correct
one.
Preview Alignment: manual setting of correct IN and OUT
markers of video footage via a special Preview Alignment Tool
to mark the beginning and end of specific sections. This step
is needed to avoid wrong preview ranges in clustered contents
and alike.
Repair / Adjustments: this final activity covers other neces-
sary manual repairs in descriptive and technical metadata (this
is a general activity at ORF whenever major changes are done
in a FESAD entry).
This is a small workflow, which is ideal for validation and
visualisation to help clarify aspects of the risk specification
and role of workflow simulation in the BPRisk framework.
However, workflows can be significantly larger and more
complex, which is a trend we can expect to continue in the
future given the adoption of automated tools for carrying out
workflow activities in the media industry. This, in turn, will
increase the demand for tools to help with workflow planning
and analysis.
In the DAVID project, the DOMAIN layer of the BPRisk
ontology has been created based on controlled vocabularies
for preservation activities, tools and risks, which has been dis-
cussed above in Section V-C. Each of the workflow activities
have been mapped to activities in this controlled vocabulary.
For example, the first activity in the workflow, ‘TSM Retrieve’,
maps to ’Acquisition/Recording’ in the preservation vocab-
ulary. And two risks have been identified for this activity:
a) wrong file selection and b) retrieve fails. The semantic
reasoning rules discussed above, in Section V, enables the
BPRisk framework to prompt users with such risks at design
time when they add the activity to the workflow they are
designing.
After specifying risks for the different activities, workflow
simulation scenarios were set up with ORF for this workflow.
To simulate workflow execution, additional parameterisation is
required, such as estimates for how often the risks are likely
to occur, and the expected time and costs for dealing with any
issues that may occur. Values were set based on the experiences
the workflow and technical experts at ORF have of the tools
and activities used in the workflow, as well as observations
from monitoring data where available. In the future, these
estimates are intended to be updated and improved via the
Risk Feedback Centre, as discussed above in Section IV-C.
B. Risk Simulation Configurations
In the MXF Repair workflow, each activity has got two
risks that can occur. The risks are a mixture of system and
human errors. For example, the ‘Retrieve Fails’ risk for the
‘TSM Retrieve’ activity is caused by technical error, while the
Figure 11. MXF Repair workflow.
‘Wrong Assessment’ risk for the ‘Mapping Control’ activity
is caused by human error.
For some activities, the two risks are mutually exclusive,
i.e., they cannot occur simultaneously; e.g., for the ‘TSM
Retrieve’, ‘Cube-Tec Repair Server INPUT-Share’ and ‘ESYS
input-Share’ activities. The activity ‘Upload’ has got two
risks that can either happen independently or simultaneously,
which requires a combined frequency risks occurrence to be
provided for this activity. Moreover, if the risk ‘Copy Error’
takes place in the previous activity (‘ESYS Input-Share’), then
the frequency of the risk ‘Fails’ (for the ‘Upload’ activity)
increases slightly (temporally). For the rest of the activities,
risks have the following dependencies: initially the risks are
modelled as mutually exclusive, however, if the ‘Overload’ risk
takes place then the frequency of the second risk increases
by the given Multiplication Factor and occurrence of this
second risk is simulated with the new frequency. That is, if
‘Overload’ occurred, it can cause the second risk such as wrong
assessment or wrong mapping to take place too.
After the activity ‘Mapping Control’, the simulation pro-
cedure will check whether any errors took place (the first
XOR gate). If there are errors, then the ‘Repair’ activity
is performed. The probability of any errors is 0.1%, i.e.,
the ‘Repair’ activity will take place very seldom during the
workflow runs. A condition after the ‘Preview Alignment’
activity checks whether any error or discrepancy is present.
It is known that probability of this error/discrepancy is 60%.
The Estimated Frequencies for each risk are estimated
based on an annual throughput of approximately 12,000 files
(1,000 monthly, 230 weekly, 46 daily). It is assumed that the
MXF Repair workflow runs 15 working hour per day, 5 days
a week, 22 working days in a month and 264 working days in
a year.
C. Simulation Results
Two simulation scenarios were explored for this workflow,
since ORF were interested in a comparison between what is
currently done to control risk and a worst-case situation in
which no risks were controlled. The ’no control’ scenario in
this sense serves to demonstrate the importance of what is
currently done. For this purpose we ran simulations with 1,000
items (files) processed via a workflow 10,000 times. Given
the throughput figures presented above, this equates to 22
days of executing the workflow. The results discussed here are
focused on demonstrating the type of insights the simulation
modelling gives users in terms of performing risk management
for business process workflows. Due to commercial sensitivity,
certain parameters such as the financial cost of dealing with
risk, are not accurate.
When a simulation is executed in the BPRisk framework,
the UI has been designed to give an overview of key facts. For
example, for a simulation scenario of the existing set-up for
controlling risk:
Risk affecting the most items (88): Upload Fails.
Total cost of risk treatments: C1,424.93.
The most expensive risk (C965.16): Upload Fails.
Total time spent on dealing with risk: 26.13 hours.
The most time consuming risk: Upload Fails.
Main issue caused is loss of Authenticity.
In terms of identifying key vulnerabilities and determining
where to target investments, the above summary gives a strong
indication towards the ‘Upload’ activity. From that point, users
can explore the data in more detail. Figure 12 shows how many
times risks occurred for each activity and how many risks
were undetected overall (mean values for the 10,000 Monte
Carlo runs). Although the ‘Fail’ risk for the ‘Upload’ activity
was flagged in the summary as the most expensive risk, both
in terms of time and cost, this figure shows that ‘Preview
Alignment’ had the most risk occurrences (followed by ‘Up-
load’ and ‘Mapping Control’). ‘TSM Retrieve’ and ‘Cube-Tec
Repair Server Input-Share’ have the smallest number of risk
occurrences. No risks took place for the ‘Repair’ activity, since
it is a rare event and it was not evoked even a single time during
the simulation. We also observe that a certain proportion of
risks are be undetected. This will incur SPOT impacts, which
we will return to below.
Figure 12. Risk occurrences and detection.
Although the ‘Preview Alignment’ activity incurs the most
risk instances, the risks occurring during the ‘Upload’ activity
will affect the largest number of items; 88 files on average
(out of the 1,000). This is significantly more than any other
activities, which is depicted in Figure 13. In comparison, the
number of affected items during ‘Preview Alignment’ was 6
on average, and 3 for ‘Mapping Control’.
Figure 13. Number of files affected by risk.
Next, we can investigate how the Ad-Hoc Control proce-
dure and Active Control cope with these risks. Figure 14 shows
a sum of Negative Consequences (NCs) for each activity with
and without Ad-Hoc Control. NC is calculated based on the
’Level of Severity’ parameter (defined in the range {1,3}), by
summing up this pre-defined value for each risk occurrence
(for each activity) that was undetected. For example, the
LS for the Upload Fails risk is 1 and the risk occurred 1
times on average, giving a NC value of 1 without control.
Mapping Control risks have defined LS as 2, and the ‘Wrong
Assessment’ risk occurs 0.63 times on average, giving a NC
value of 1.26 without control.
Not surprisingly, the difference in NC between the two
scenarios is significant. If no Ad-Hoc Control procedure is in
a place, then the largest NC from risks will be for ‘Mapping
Control’, ‘Preview Alignment’ and ‘ESYS Input-Share’. The
Ad-Hoc Control procedure reduces NC to zero for all risks
that have been detected. However, for risks such as ‘Wrong
Assessment’ for the ‘Mapping Control’ activity, the Detection
Level is set to 75%, giving a small NC value of 0.32 as the
risk only occurred 0.63 times on average during the simulation.
The top three activities in terms of the highest NC is almost
identical when Ad-Hoc Control is applied; the difference is
that the ‘Upload’ activity has replaced ‘ESYS Input-Share’.
Figure 14. Negative consequences with and without Ad-Hoc Control.
Undetected, uncontrolled, risks will have an impact, which
we represent according to the SPOT model (discussed above
in Section VI-B). For this simulation, the SPOT impact can
be seen in Figure 15, comparing the two scenarios with–
and without control. The values in this figure are calculated
similarly to NC, above, by summarising the number of times
risks have been either undetected or have not been successfully
“fixed” in a control procedure. This gives an appreciation of
the types of issues to the digital content, caused by the various
risks. For example, when risks are controlled, the main issue
is loss of authenticity, which is interesting for this type of
workflow. Authenticity, as described in Section VI-B refers
to the digital content indeed being what it purports to be.
Considering that this workflow addresses format compatibility
issues, which includes issues such as incorrect or inconsistent
meta-data to describe digital content, authenticity being the
main issue despite controlling the known risks is interesting
as it reflects that the repair processes itself is not 100%.
The Ad-Hoc Control procedure is successful for this MXF
Repair workflow in dealing with risks. As seen in Figure 15,
the SPOT impacts are minor when the risks are controlled.
However, controlling risks incurs costs, both in terms of time
to deal with the risk occurrence, as well as financial cost.
Figure 16 shows a pie chart that illustrates well the propor-
tional differences in financial cost for addressing risks for the
different activities, in which the Upload activity accounts for
approximately 68% of the total costs. Moreover, addressing
the risks to this activity takes 19.30 hours on average, which
is approximately 2.5 working days out of the 22 days of
simulating this workflow execution.
Active Control was only activated once, during the ‘Repair
Adjustment’ activity. This was for the risk ‘Overload’, which
Figure 15. SPOT properties affected by risk (impact - with and without
control).
Figure 16. Cost of Ad-Hoc Control.
resulted in a cost of C500 in this simulation scenario. Although
the Ad-Hoc Control procedure of dealing with risks is very
effective in this particular workflow, it is of interest to rank
risks according to impact on a workflow based on a generic
score. Table II shows the ranking of risks according to impact
score, which was calculated as the product of the number
affected items and negative consequences, based on the mean
values from the 10,000 simulation runs of the ORF MXF
Repair workflow under condition that no Ad-Hoc Control
procedure was in place. The ranking is an approach to pre-
senting the risk simulation results in a way to help identify
prioritisations of which risks to address. Not only does this
representation identify which activities are the most vulnerable
to risk, but also we can see that the top 5 highest ranked risks
are of the same type - overload. This kind of information,
therefore, indicates there is a common technological issue with
the systems used not being able to handle the workflow. There
may, instead, be alternative systems available, which could be
considered in different workflow scenarios to then compare
potential ROI, e.g., in terms of whether there is financial gain
in upgrading a system if it reduces the risk occurrences.
D. Evaluation and Discussion of Simulation Results
Based on the results discussed above, this section is an
evaluation technical experts (workflow designers) from ORF
based on the observations they have made in reality. Both
ranking of risk/activities and the impact is giving an exact
picture of the actual situation ORF experienced when running
the MXF Repair workflow. For example, they experienced
several upload-fails and ‘Overload’ was indeed the greatest
issue in ‘Preview-Alignment’.
Even the ranking from the simulation results (Table II) is
nearly identical to ORF’s experience. The top three is identical.
Thereafter, there are just a few instances of risks that have
a rank difference of 1 place. Even at the very end of the
ranking the results match ORF’s experience, which impressed
their workflow-designers very much. Also, in this section of
the results, there is only one swap in ranking positions. In
the actual workflow ‘Retrieve Fails’ was slightly higher than
‘Wrong File selected’. This may be due to the fact that in the
early part of the MXF Repair process they experienced some
severe network-issues.
The results for risk occurrence and the number of affected
items show a similar picture; the results of the simulation
match with our experience during the actual workflow execu-
tion. Just the absolute number of affected items for ‘Upload’
‘Fails’ seems to be too high; a first explanation may be the
fact that in the actual workflow those upload failures had a
significant concentration in the first 6 months of the MXF
Repairs (due to several changes in the affected ESYS-systems)
– and from the same time frame the values for the simulation-
model has been taken.
The effect of Ad-Hoc Control, shown in Figure 14, is a very
strong argument and help for implementing a proper instalment
for control measurements. And again the figures for NC in
the different activities reflect very well the actual situation in
the MXF Repair workflow; very interesting is the rather high
effect of “technical” measurements (e.g., in ESYS Input Share)
compared to those with “human-related” measurements (e.g.,
Mapping Control).
The high impact of Ad-Hoc Control reflects again the
actual experience and strengthens our arguments in “investing”
in those by having a rather large overhead budget available.
Especially the results in the SPOT model for Ad-Hoc Control
are very impressive and promising. Finally, the results for costs
are significant assets for putting forth arguments in budget
discussions for future workflows in the domain. The extremely
positive impact of Ad-Hoc Control was always neglected or
doubted by the decision-makers at ORF.
It has to be stressed here, that the quality of the results
are based not only on the model, but also on the quality of
the input-data given. ORF put significant effort and time in
providing accurate and reliable data for both the model and
the simulation, so it has to be expected that the old archive-
rule “Garbage in = Garbage out” is valid for risk management
and assessment as well. You have to invest a good percentage
of the budget reserved for “accompanying measures” for this
activity (in case of the MXF Repair workflow, approximately
1
3 ), which included the calculation and surveying of quality
planning data to get good results and actually have the chance
to save money in the actual workflow or process. And being an
expert or involving experts in the domain is highly necessary
to save efforts in this process of planning and data collection.
For all colleagues at ORF involved in the process, the tool
proves to be a very good and highly reliable instrument to
evaluate risks and their actual impact even before or at an
early stage of the implementation of a workflow. However, as
discussed above, if the model is not configured with the right
TABLE II. Risk ranking according to simulation results and ORF - in descending order.
Activity Risk Impact Score Rank ORF Rank
Upload Fails Very high 86.99 1 1
Preview Alignment Overload High 8.58 2 2
ESYS Input-Share Overload High 3.46 3 3
Mapping Control Overload High 3.46 4 5
Repair / Adjustments Overload High 3.09 4 4
Preview Alignment Wrong assessment Medium 1.75 5 7
Cube-Tec Repair
Server Input-Share
Overload Medium 1.28 6 6
Mapping Control Wrong assessment Medium 1.28 7 7
Upload Wrong parameters Medium 0.64 8 8
ESYS Input-Share Copy error Low 0.19 9 9
TSM Retrieve Wrong file selected Low 0.14 10 11
TSM Retrieve Retrieve fails Low 0.14 11 10
Cube-Tec Repair
Server Input-Share
Copy error Low 0.03 12 12
Repair / Adjustments Wrong assessment Very low 0 13 13
Repair Wrong mapping Very low 0 13 14
Repair Overload Very low 0 13 14
(and accurate) data, the results will not match with reality.
Therefore, it is important to complete the risk management
process, based on the Deming cycle, to capture monitoring
information from the workflow executions to update both the
risk information and simulation configuration to improve the
accuracy.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented a Business Process Risk management
framework (BPRisk) that allows users to manage workflow
processes with regards to risk in order to reduce cost and
increase the long-term value of digital media content. The
framework is generic in nature, but has been discussed here
in the context of digital preservation, where the objective is
to avoid damage to the digital content and ensuring that the
content can be accessed in the future.
The BPRisk framework combines workflow specification
and risk management. It has been designed in accordance with
a risk management process based on the Deming (PDCA)
cycle and we have shown how it relates to the stages of the
ISO 31000 risk methodology. Long-term digital preservation
is threatened by format obsolescence, media degradation, and
failures in the very people, processes and systems designed
to keep the content safe and accessible. Therefore, investing
in substantial planning and design is essential in order to
prevent issues that may not be possible to rectify; rendering the
content unusable. Further, key to the risk management process
is continual improvement, i.e., risk management is not merely
a static exercise performed at design time [13], but it is also
imperative during process change.
A layered semantic risk model has been presented, which
a) enables reasoning about threats in a workflow and b) assists
end-users (who are typically not risk experts) by automatically
suggesting relevant risks and respective controls for workflow
activities. This helps the workflow designers specify more
robust workflows, reducing the risk of causing irretrievable
damage to the media content. Moreover, the framework helps
workflow designers optimise workflows and improve cost-
benefit by identifying (and addressing) key vulnerabilities by
simulating workflow executions to estimate the impact of risk.
The simulation service in the BPRisk framework allows
users to estimate the impact of risks before executing the
workflow, which increases the chances of detecting issues
rather than jeopardising the real media content. A workflow
simulation provides users with information about inter alia
the quantity of media content that may be affected by risk
(and how), and the time and cost of dealing with risk (i.e.,
control and treatment). Therefore, organisational impacts can
be derived and users may simulate different what-if scenar-
ios in order to evaluate different workflow designs before
proceeding with executing a particular workflow process on
live material. What-if scenarios may, e.g., involve justifying
reasons for putting in place certain control mechanisms by
showing that the ROI is positive.
A prototype of the BPRisk framework has been developed
in the DAVID project. To demonstrate the application of
the framework and the value of the simulation results, we
have reported on an evaluation scenario with the Austrian
Broadcasting Corporation (ORF). The technical experts at ORF
found the results to be almost identical to what they have
observed by executing the workflow. Key benefits emphasised
include: a) investing time in workflow planning and controlling
risks in order to prevent issues, and b) justifying workflow
designs and risk controls to decision makers.
Further research involves implementing mechanisms for
automatically updating risk models and respective simulation
configurations according to observed workflow execution data
in order to improve the support for continual improvement of
workflow processes.
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